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Iraq faces structural reforms designed to effect transition from opaque administrative structures 
to competitive markets. The process has already begun with a series of measures announced by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq. The paper provides arguments in favor of establishing 
liberal, preferably free trade regime based on past foreign trade performance indicating that there 
is not much to protect, Saddam Hussein’s legacy of negotiated free trade agreements with most 
Arab countries and domestic political economy considerations. It also argues in favor of radical 
reforms in measures shaping business climate as well as explores institutional measures to lock-in 
a current liberal trade regime.  
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1. Introduction1 
Trade  regime  facilitating  and  promoting  international  transactions  is  only  one  of  many 
ingredients that are indispensable to put a country on the path of sustainable economic growth. 
Without effective political system, fully liberalized prices, environment friendly to private business 
and  investment,  macroeconomic  stability,  even  the  best  trade  regime  will  fail  to  trigger  supply 
response and accomplish this objective.  
Yet,  this  should  not  suggest  that  reforming  foreign  trade  regime  could  wait  till  other 
components are in place. To the contrary, unreformed trade institutions could perpetuate or lead to 
the  emergence  of  huge  rent-seeking  opportunities  and  opposition  to  reforms.  These  groups 
blocked reforms in many transition economies. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has partly 
preempted this possibility. CPA Order 12 suspended tariffs and other border charges until January 
1, 2004, and CPA Order 38, while de facto introducing an equivalent of a uniform tariff schedule in 
disguise, has prolonged a transparent and simple trade regime for another two years.  
Measures adopted by CPA in late September 2003 suggest CPA’s commitment to follow the 
radical approach to economic reforms, as opposed to gradualism advocated by many international 
advisors.  Three  most recent  acts  of  the  CPA  establishing  liberal  regimes  of  taxation,  banking, 
foreign investment and foreign trade have closed various loopholes and promise to expose the 
Iraqi  economy  to  competition  from  imports  and  foreign  investors.2  This  happened  despite 
opposition from some on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as well as within CPA. A commentary 
published two weeks before CPA issued ‘reform orders’ by Oxford Analytica (October 6, 2003) had 
a telling title “IRAQ: Rapid economic opening may be scaled back.”  
The  Iraqi  reform  package,  announced  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  World  Bank  and 
International Monetary Fund in Dubai, has already come under attack. It has been dubbed neo-
conservative,  extreme,  etc.  New  York  Times’  reporter  Jeff  Maddrick  (2003)  observes  that  by 
mainstream economist’s standards introduced measures are extreme and “in fact stunning,” He 
writes:  “The  current  plan  is  supported  neither  by  theory  nor  experience,  only  by  the  wishful 
ideological thinking of its advocates. Its consequences, as in Russia, could be widespread cruelty.” 
This observation misses the point completely, as Russia neither adopted radical shock nor opened 
its economy to external competition. Russia’s fatal experience was not with swift liberalization, as, 
for instance, Dabrowski and Antczak (1996) have convincingly shown. To the contrary, exclusion of 
oil,  non-ferrous  and  other  easily  marketable  raw  materials  from  price  liberalization  fueled  rent 
                                                  
1  This  is  a  revised  version  of  a  paper  presented  at  an  internal  CASE  seminar  “Economic  Reforms  in  Iraq”  on 
September 17, 2003. The views expressed in this paper are solely mine and do not represent views of any organization 
with which I am affiliated. I gratefully acknowledge very helpful discussions, direct and through internet, with Marek 
Belka, Marek Dabrowski, and Saumya Mitra. I benefited also from comments made by participants at the seminar. The 
usual caveats apply. 
2 See the CPA Orders Number 37 (taxes), 38 (reconstruction levy on imports), 39 (foreign investment), and 40 
(banking),  all  issued  last  September,  available  at  the  Iraq  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  website  http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations.   
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seeking  and  more  importantly  the  emergence  of  powerful  ‘newly-rich’  group  of  oligarchs  that 
subsequently blocked measures increasing competition in the Russian economy. 
Furthermore, CPA’s measures are neither as radical as they are portrayed nor do they ignore 
the experience of transition from central planning. Corporate income tax of 15 percent is hardly 
stunning. In fact, it is 15 percentage points higher than in Estonia (zero corporate income tax rate), 
2.5 percentage points higher than in Ireland. It is the same as in Lithuania and Latvia (beginning in 
2004),  and  3  percentage  points  lower  than  in  Hungary  in  2003.  Next  year,  it  will  be only  one 
percentage point higher than in Hungary and four percentage points higher than in Poland and 
Slovakia. This hardly strikes one as extremism. 
Neither is a 5 percent reconstruction levy, a uniform tariff rate under a different label, such a 
radical and irresponsible measure. Consider that a simple average MFN (Most Favored Nation) 
tariff rate levied on imports in industrial economies was 4 percent in 1999. Estonia, Hong Kong, 
Singapore had zero, and Latvia or Uruguay 5 percent.3  
While these criticisms may demonstrate the lack of knowledge of contemporary economics in 
general and that of economics of transition in particular, they cannot be ignored. They are strongly 
reminiscent of the debate: radicalism versus gradualism of the early 1990s. While the field was 
then open for speculations, now at least we have abundance of empirical evidence. Gradualism in 
the  first-generation  reforms  (liberalization  of  prices,  foreign  trade,  business  entry,  and  current 
account convertibility) enriched few at the expense of general economic welfare and inflicted huge 
economic  costs.  Capture  of  reforms  by  private  interests  for  their  own  enrichment  has  been 
trademark in a number of transition economies including Russia and Ukraine.  
Hence,  directing  entrepreneurial  talents  towards  welfare  enhancing  activities  rather  than 
exploiting rent opportunities should be one of the major concerns of those responsible for reforms. 
The  design  of  foreign  trade  and  investment  institutions  and  policies  together  with  price 
liberalization plays an important role in it. They all should subject domestic actors to competition 
from outside. 
But should the CPA or the future Iraqi government decide on the course of economic reforms? 
It would be tempting to argue that only a legitimate government acceptable to the Iraqi population 
can make decisions with impact on the future of Iraq. But there are many governments with little, or 
none,  legitimacy  that  make  similar  decisions  without  objections  from  international  community. 
However, much more important to the point is that sound economic policy decisions can rarely 
withstand  domestic  political  pressures  unless  the  economy  is  in  a  deep  crisis.  The  pressure 
coming from banks, international financial institutions and creditor governments has provided the 
necessary  stimulus  to  domestic  reforms  in  debt-trapped  developing  countries  in  the  1980s. 
Economic crisis drove the move away from central planning in the late 1980s. In brief, external 
actors  may  prevail  over  domestic  politics.  While  many  areas  of  public  policy  reforms  (e.g., 
privatization of large state-owned enterprises) may require their ‘local ownership,’ most are more 
                                                  
3 All data from Appendix Table 1 in B. Hoekman et al. (2002, 562-64).  
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likely  to  be  implemented  with  huge  economic  welfare  benefits  for  the  population  writ  large  by 
external actors.  
In fact, the largest service that the CPA can render the Iraqi people is to introduce potentially 
painful and politically unpopular reform that are indispensable to set the economy on the path of 
sustainable  economic  growth,  before  the  Iraq  government  fully  emerges  though  democratic 
process. The ‘new’ government may dismantle some of these – in fact, many potential investors 
are  deeply  concerned  with  a  possible  turn-around  to  opaque  administrative  arrangements 
characteristic of Middle Eastern economies. Yet, there is a good chance that many good reforms 
survive  domestic  political  scrutiny  once  they  demonstrate  their  effectiveness  in  meeting  policy 
goals and once general public appreciates transparency and lower potential for corruption. While 
none of these guarantees irreversibility, this is a better option than keeping in place old regulations 
that would effectively block reconstruction effort and economic recovery of Iraq.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 seeks to reproduce from partner 
statistics developments in Iraq foreign trade, including the scope of illicit trade, and outlines major 
features  of  foreign  trade  regime  before  the  2003  war.  This  regime  had  contributed  to  the 
emergence  of  large  group  of  people  with  significant  financial  assets,  which  has  significant 
implications  for  reforms.  Keeping  competition  out  would  only  increase  their hold  over  the  Iraqi 
economy.  Section  2  reviews  arguments  in  favor  of  protection.  The  examination  of  Iraqi  export 
performance shows that there had been almost nothing left to protect and no case can be made 
even for ‘infant protection.’ Section 3 makes the argument for free trade. Section 4 explains why a 
free trade regime does not usually emerge as a result of the domestic reform process, but needs 
an external push. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Foreign trade regime and sanctions: implications for reforms 
Saddam’s foreign trade regime was reminiscent of foreign trade arrangements under orthodox, 
unreformed central planning, albeit with many caveats. For starters, although the scope of state 
controls was similarly pervasive, the size of the private sector was much larger. Furthermore, since 
the imposition of UN economic sanctions in 1990, it had a dual structure – a legal and illegal one, 
both under the direct Baathist control. In consequence, smuggling and access to authorities and 
foreign exchange allocations rather than tariffs and non-tariff measures shaped imports. This was a 
deeply corrupt regime. It had led to enrichment of a few well connected with implications for a 
broad spectrum of reforms ranging from foreign trade, foreign investment and privatization. 
Duality of foreign trade regime 
Wars  and  sanctions  had  led  to  a  more  direct  state  involvement  in  foreign  trade 
micromanagament. Under the UN trade sanctions adopted following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990, Iraq’s exports and imports were subject to international controls.  In 1991-96 Iraq  
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was allowed to export oil to Jordan and import through Jordan’s port of Aqaba where independent 
Lloyd's  inspectors  oversaw  Iraq-bound  shipments.  The  arrangements  under  the  Oil-for-Food 
Program  (OFP),  effectively  launched  in  December  1996,  required  a  detailed  administrative 
planning of import needs by relevant Iraqi government agencies. These were subject to review and 
final decision by the UN Office for the Iraq Programme with the proceeds of oil sales to be paid into 
an UN-administered escrow account. Following the implementation of the OFP in December 1996, 
exports increased more than five times and import more than doubled in 1997. 
The foreign trade regime had two pillars: the official one organized around the OFP and the 
unofficial (mostly illegal in terms of UN trade embargo) one. Access to conducting foreign trade 
activities  was  essentially  limited  to  Foreign  Trade  Organizations  of  the  Ministry  of  Trade.  The 
Ministry was (and remains) responsible for submitting the list of needed imports to the OIP in 
charge of distributing shipments coming under the OFP, which accounted for ‘all legal’ imports. 
Procedures  involved  reminded  one  of  administrative  arrangements  under  unreformed  central 
planning. Instead of a central planner making the final decision, the UN Office for Iraq Programme 
performed  this  function.  In  order  to  import,  private  firms  had  to  obtain  licenses  for  individual 
transactions. This as a rule implied side-payments to officials often in the form of guaranteed share 
in  revenues  from  sales  of  imported  products.  Another  complicating  factor  was  that  access  to 
foreign  currency  was  rationed  through  a  multiple  exchange  rate  regime  leading  to  huge  black 
market premia. In early 2003, for instance, the US$ black market rate was ID 2,000, while the 
official rate was at ID 0.311. 
The current regime remains dual and transitional. Duality stems from the coexistence of the 
OFP  subject  to  administrative  micromanagement  and  private  sector  trade  activities  under  a 
market-based free trade regime. The CPA Order 38 did not put an end duality, as it excluded 
imports under the OFP from reconstruction levy. These imports include food but also materials, 
equipment, etc., which are items that have been recently increasingly brought into Iraq by private 
traders.  They  will  now  have  to  compete  on  an  unequal  base.  Furthermore,  as  long  as  prices 
remain administratively controlled measures curbing exports of these products are necessary.4    In 
sum, the coexistence of two import regimes and controlled prices, while necessary, contribute to 
the persistence of distortions in the Iraqi economy.  
Trade: where have all trade surpluses gone? 
Iraq neither published nor reported its foreign trade data to international organizations. There 
are two sources of information on its trade activities – mirror statistics, i.e., transactions reported by 
foreign trade partner to the IMF Direction-of-Trade (DOT) and UN COMTRADE databases, and 
imports and exports conducted under the OFP. The latter cover only the 1996-2003 period (Table 
1). Taken together they offer some glimpses into Iraqi foreign trade performance. 
                                                  
4  This  provides  one  with  another  argument  in  favor  of  a  quick  dismantling  of  administrative  rationing  and  full 
liberalization of prices.  
                Studies & Analyses  No. 259 - Economic Regime for Iraq: The Foreign Trade Perspective 
10 
Table 1: Average exports and imports in three periods, 1989-90, 1991-96, and 1997-02 (in billion of US 
dollars and percent) 
  1989-90  1991-96  1997-02 
Exports (average)  12.5  0.53  9.45 
Imports (average)  7.4  0.50  2.95 
Index: Exports 1989-90=100  100  4.3  75.6 
Index: Imports 1989-90=100  100  6.8  39.9 
Source: IMF Direction-of-Trade database. 
For comparative and analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish three phases in Iraq’ foreign 
trade developments: the pre-Gulf war period 1989-90; the embargo period 1991-96; and the OFP 
period over 1997-2002. As can be seen from data in Table 1 based on mirror statistic, the cutting 
dates reflect actual developments in the sanctions regime, i.e., almost a total embargo affected 
trade in 1991-96, and the OFP had an impact beginning in 1997.5 Trade came to a virtual halt in 
the 1991-96 period. It is worth noting that exports appear to have been less affected than imports. 
Reported exports stood on average at 4.3 percent of their average value in 1989-90 and imports at 
7 percent. In value terms, they were 25 and 60 percent lower in 1997-02 than before the Gulf War 
in 1991.  
The composition of both exports and imports underwent significant changes (Table 2). On the 
export side, the reliance on oil increased from 96.8 percent in 1989 to 97.6 percent in 1991-96 and 
99.5 percent in 1997-2001. Simultaneously, the share of manufactures dropped almost ten-fold 
from 2.1 percent in 1989 to 0.23 percent in 1997-2001. The change in imports was much less 
pointed between 1989 and 1997-2001. Interestingly, the share of manufactured goods increased 
more than three percentage points. 
Trade embargo significantly impacted not only the level and composition but also the directions 
of trade. Turkey followed by Jordan emerged as Iraq’s major suppliers of foreign goods in 1991-96. 
These two countries provided Iraq with 60 percent of all its imports in the 1991-96 period. In the 
OFP period the level of geographical concentration of Iraq’s imports has significantly declined. 
France with the total sales of US$ 2 billion over 1997-2002 tops the list of ten largest suppliers. 
The EU altogether accounted in this period for 33 percent of total Iraqi imports down from 40 
percent in 1989-90. Not surprisingly, the US and the United Kingdom, which together contributed 
21 percent of Iraqi imports in 1989-90, has not made to the top-ten list in 1997-2002. The US 
accounted for a mere 1.7 percent and the UK for 1.9 percent of the total foreign sales to Iraq in this 
period. 
 
                                                  
5  Although  the  Security  Council  established  the  Oil-for-Food  Program  on  14  April  1995,  deliveries  began  in 
December 1996.   
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Table 2: Composition of exports and imports in 1989, 1991-96, 1997-01 
  Exports in million of US$  Imports in million of US$ 
    Average  Average    Average  Average 
PRODUCT GROUP  1989  1991-96  1997-01  1989  1993-95  1999-01 
All food products (0+1+22+4)  60.1  3.3  14.1  1,840  305  601.2 
Agricultural materials (2-22-27-28)  27.7  0.5  1.2  241  1.5  9.1 
Textile fibers (26)  7.3  0.2  0.9  89  0.5  0.9 
Ores, Minerals and Metals (27+28+68)  45.2  0.8  6.0  154  1.3  11.4 
Energy (3)  12,234.6  423  9,589  17  0  2 
All Manufactured Goods (5 to 8 - 68)  265.6  5.3  21.9  5,878  128  1,925 
Goods (0 to 8)  12,640.5  433.6  9,633.4  8,218,371  437  2,548.9 
  (in terms of percent) 
All food products (0+1+22+4)  0.48  0.76  0.15  22.54  69.79  23.59 
Agricultural materials (2-22-27-28)  0.22  0.12  0.01  2.43  0.34  0.36 
Textile fibers (26)  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.89  0.11  0.04 
Ores, Minerals and Metals (27+28+68)  0.36  0.18  0.06  1.65  0.30  0.45 
Energy (3)  96.79  97.56  99.54  0.22  0.00  0.08 
All Manufactured Goods (5 to 8 - 68)  2.10  1.22  0.23  72.26  29.29  75.52 
Goods (0 to 8)  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Derived from data in UN COMTRADE database. 
How do trade data reported in mirror statistics match with the data from the UN Office of the 
Iraqi Program (OIP) in charge of the OFP? On the export side, there appears to be no significant 
differences with the revenue generated under the OFP of US$ 3.2 billion higher than total exports 
reported in IMF DOT statistics or 5.3 percent.6 On the import side, the differences are much more 
significant with the value of all OFP “arrived” shipments (US$ 25 billion) 29 percent higher than the 
value of world exports to Iraq reported in IMF DOT statistics (US$ 18 billion). It appears that buyers 
of Iraqi goods (almost exclusively oil) appear to have provided more detailed information, whereas 
countries exporting to Iraq were reluctant (or simply too sloppy) to disclose in their statistics all 
relevant information. This was so despite the fact that the difference refers to transactions under 
the OFP, fully conforming to international norms. 
Trade with Iraq reported to the DOT database by some countries was surprisingly low despite 
close  geographical  proximity  and  anecdotal  evidence  suggesting  much  more  significant  flows. 
Syria  and  Turkey,  for  instance,  reported  no  trade  activity  in  the  OFP  period  to  the  IMF  DOT 
statistics  –  Turkey  since  1996  and  Syria  since  1997.7  Turkey  continued,  however,  its  trade 
                                                  
6 Since all payments were made not to the government of Iraq but to the UN (or more precisely Bank National de 
Paris, which was handling financial side of the OFP and issued letters of credit), this suggests that some countries failed 
to report even legitimate imports from Iraq. Source: UN Office of the Iraq Program (http://www.un.org/Depts/oip). 
7 While Turkey stopped reporting its trade with Iraq to the IMF DOT database, it continued submitting data on its 
exports and imports from Iraq until 1998 to the UN COMTRADE database. One has serious doubts, however, as to their  
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relationship with Iraq in the 19977-02 period even seeking exemption from the UN sanction regime 
similar to that enjoyed by Jordan. Before the Gulf War Turkey was an important trading partner 
contributing 4 percent to total Iraqi imports in 1989-90, and it had emerged as the largest exporter 
over 1991-96. Habur gate, the only legal crossing point between Turkey and Iraq, has remained 
open since the end of Gulf War. According to Turkish officials,8 trade between the two countries, 
mainly under Iraq’s oil-for-food deal with the UN, did not exceed $200 million in 2000, down by 32 
percent the level reached in recent years. The average value of Turkish exports to Iraq in 1991-96 
was around US$ 160 million, while that of imports amounted to US$ 11 million. Assuming that the 
ratio of imports to exports remained as reported by Turkey in 1991-96, this would suggest that 
Turkish exports were probably at around US$ 150 – 200 million per year over 1997-2002. 
Syria  entered  during  the  OFP  period  into  several  lucrative  commercial  deals  with  Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. The value of Syria’s reported total exports to Iraq over 1989-2002 was US $28.6 
million with practically all these exports taking place in 1997 (US$ 28.3 million). Syria reported 
imports from Iraq only for 1991-96 to the tune of US$ 0.4 million. Considering improved political 
ties that began with reopening of their border in 1997 that was closed after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990, one suspects that there was trade, albeit not reported. According to the official Syrian 
Tishrin daily, during the first nine months in 2001, Syrian exports to Iraq totaled $1.35 billion, more 
than double the total for the whole of 2000.9 Although a huge portion of these exports might have 
been simply re-exports by Syrian firm skirting the trade embargo, this nonetheless add significantly 
to the value of Iraqi imports. Together with ‘probable’ Turkish exports this would raise Iraqi total 
imports by around US$ 1.5-1.8 billion in 2001 and US$ 1 billion in 2000. 
Egypt appears to provide another example of underreporting. Egypt’s trade turnover with Iraq 
was  “…an  estimated  $2  billion  in  2002,  the  second  year  the  Iraq-Egypt  FTA  was  in  place, 
according to trade officials.”10 This contrasts rather dramatically with Egypt’s reported imports from 
Iraq of US$ 1 million in both 2001 and 2002 and exports of US$ 91 and 94 million respectively. 
According to Iraqi Minister of Trade, Mohammed Mahdi Saleh speaking in 2001, Egypt was the 
third largest trade partner after France and Russia.11 Neither Russia nor Egypt according to the 
IMF DOT statistics would qualify as such in any single year over 1997-2002, which would suggest 
that Russia also failed to disclose publicly its trade activities with Iraq. 
 According to the DOT statistics in 2000, Russia with exports of US$ 90 million would rank 
eight and Egypt (US$ 75 million) would rank twelfth. To make things a little more confusing, Iraqi 
                                                                                                                                                               
accuracy. The value of exports reported in 1997 was US$ 54 million down from US$ 188 million in 1996, and US$ 11 
million in 1998. This would suggest dramatically steep contraction, which probably occurred only in statistics. 
8 See the Reuters dispatch: “Iraq and Turkey to significantly boost bilateral trade. Both countries pledge to bring 
trade to pre-1990 Gulf war levels, according to Iraqi minister.”  March 1, 2000, 03:12 PM, Baghdad (Reuters) 
9 See http://www.syrialive.net/financial. (January 22, 2002). 
10 “In the program's first four years, France won more than $3 billion in contracts. But this year it was eclipsed by 
Egypt as Iraq's top trade partner, and now French companies are likely to be getting fewer contracts.” See Lederer 
(2001). 
11  “Egypt  third  largest  trade  partner  with  Iraq  after  France,  Russia.”  Iraq-Egypt  Economics,  April  18,  2001  at 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily.   
                                                                          Studies & Analyses  No. 259 – Bartlomiej Kaminski 
13 
trade officials suggested that Egypt became the largest exporter to Iraq in 2002.12 It is difficult to 
estimate how much of this trade went underreported and whether the portion not reported in trade 
statistics  of  these  countries  submitted  to  international  organizations  was  illicit  exports.  But  if 
Egyptian and Russian exports were indeed second only to those of France, then they were higher 
than Australia’s (second largest exporter in 2000) exports valued at US$ 342 million.13 This would 
add another US$ 500-600 million to Iraqi imports.  
In all, a very conservative estimate is that around 30 percent of imports into Iraq were not 
reported  to  the  DOT  database.  Had  all  ‘legitimate’  exports  to  Iraq  been  reported,  the  actual 
average value in 1997-2002 was probably higher than the average of US$ 4.1 billion per year as 
reported by the OFP data. The total estimate of trade flows of Egypt, Russia, Turkey, and Syria 
that were not reported to the IMF DOT statistics is at least US$ 1.8 billion.14 Adding the estimated 
value of these flows to the average annual total world exports to Iraq as reported in the DOT 
statistics (US$ 2.95 billion) would yield the annual average of Iraqi imports of US$ 4.7 billion, i.e., 
US$  562  million  higher  than  OIP  data.  These  calculations  would  suggest  that  Iraqi  imports 
circumventing the OFP ran at around at least US$ 562 million per year over 1997-2002. 
But there are indications that these imports might have run in billions of dollars, as Iraqi foreign 
exchange earnings were significantly higher than in OIP data. A US General Accounting Office 
estimated that Iraq earned about $2.2 billion in illicit revenues in 2001 – $1.5 billion in illicit exports 
and $700 million in surcharges (reportedly paid to Iraq by oil trading companies of 20 to 50 cents 
per barrel of oil).15 Other estimates are at a similar range. Iraqi oil smuggling to Jordan, Syria and 
Turkey and through Iranian waters provided it with “… more than $1 billion a year in cash – which 
goes directly to Saddam.”(Lederer, 2001).  
These  estimates  appear  to  have  solid  foundations.  Consider  first,  for  instance,  that  Syrian 
gateway alone could have generated almost US$ 1 billion in extra exports in 2001. Following the 
opening of an oil pipeline through Syria, both countries signed a swap agreement under which 
Syria  used  Iraqi  oil  sold  at  a  50  percent  discount  and  exported  an  equivalent  of  its  own  oil.  
Reportedly, this line was used to smuggle $2 million worth of oil daily (Recknagel 2001). On an 
annual basis, this would amount to around US$ 800 million of illicit exportation bypassing the UN 
OFP, which required that all Iraqi oil revenues be placed in a UN- supervised escrow account for 
spending only for approved purchases. 
Second, Turkey appears to have been also heavily involved in imports bypassing the OFP. 
According to Katzman (2002), the Turkish government regulated and taxed about US$ 400 million 
of  illicit  imports  of  Iraqi  energy  products  per  year.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  above  estimate 
includes  US$  400  million  worth  of  oil  that  was  apparently  smuggled  by  trucks  into  Turkey 
                                                  
12 “In the program's first four years, France won more than $3 billion in contracts. But this year it was eclipsed by 
Egypt as Iraq's top trade partner, and now French companies are likely to be getting fewer contracts.” See Lederer (202).  
13 One assumes that both Australia and France have provided accurate trade statistical information. 
14 The total was arrived as follows: Egypt’s and Russia’s estimated exports were around US$ 550 million each; 
Syria’s around 500 million; and Turkey’s 160 million. 
15 Quoted in Katzman (2002).  
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(Recknagel 2001). This so-called “diesel trade” had become commonplace there until September 
2001, when Turkey banned this trade. Thereafter, truckers could bring in only crude oil under the 
OFP program (Martin 2003). 
Thus, it would seem that the estimate of the U.S. Government Accounting Office is close to the 
mark in terms of Iraqi extra export earnings. In all, it appears that on average annual Iraqi exports 
during the OFP period were around US$ 2 billion higher than the OIP data. Adding the estimate of 
illicit exports would increase the total earning by US$ 6-9 billion to US$ 66-69 billion over 1997-
2002.  
The import side is fuzzier. The difference between data reported in the IMF DOT statistics 
(US$ 18 billion) and the UN OIP data (US$25 billion) is huge amounting to 29 percent. It appears 
that even countries whose firms participate in the OFP did not collect and submit relevant statistics 
on their exports to Iraq totaling US$ 7 billion in 1997-2002. As mentioned earlier, this would raise 
annual imports to US$ 4.2 billion. We may only guess that revenues from illicit exports were not 
only stashed in cash by the authorities (or deposited abroad) but also expensed on purchases 
abroad.  It would  be  impossible  to  estimate  how  they  were  allotted  between  the  two and  what 
services and goods and originating where were imported outside the sanctions regime. One would 
expect, however, that at least 50 percent of illicit revenues were spent on imports. This would give 
an initial estimate of around US$ 5 billion over 1997-2002. 
How close is this estimate to the actual levels of imports into Iraq? One way of testing it would 
be to estimate the size of cumulative surpluses during the OFP period. This would amount to 
around US$ 7 billion annually or US$ 42 billion. Out of it, US$ 14.1 billion is in the OFP approved 
pipeline of purchases that were not delivered before January 1, 2003. The balance of US$ 28 
billion appears to be in line with compensation and other payments mandated by the UN Security 
Council as presented in the November 2002 Report of the Secretary-General. Note, however, that 
the assumption underlying these estimates is that 50 percent of illicit revenues were spent on 
imports. This is, however, only an assumption without any empirical evidence. 
But whatever the actual levels of imports were, the scope for enrichment to the well connected 
in both private and state sector had been clearly enormous. Unaccounted expenditures run in 
hundred of millions, if not billions dollars. On top of illicit transactions, black market operations and 
smuggling, one should add informal commissions paid often by suppliers under the OFP to Iraqi 
officials. While some of these fortunes have been responsible for surge in prices of real estate in 
elegant districts of Amman, much of it is in Iraq. According to one source, Iraq has around 3,000 
families each with the net worth estimated in millions of dollars up from about 50 thirty-five years 
ago  with  the  wealthiest  controlling  billions  of  dollars  (Yasseen  2003).  It  is  clear  that  intimate 
association with the regime allowed many, if not most of them to increase their wealth.   
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Political economy implications for reforms 
The  most  direct  implication  is  that  arrangements  that  allowed  collecting  rents  should  be 
terminated. As Yasseen (2003), advisor to a member of Iraq’s Governing Council, notes: “These 
arrangements, which were not weakened by the UN embargo, made possible tenfold return on 
investment very quickly.” The end of sanctions as well as foreign trade measures taken by CPA 
has effectively put an end to these opportunities. The crux of the matter is to maintain an open 
foreign trade regime. 
Leaving aside a difficult task of vetting out those, who illegitimately made fortune, reforms do 
have a direct bearing. For starters, exposing the economy to foreign investment will at least put 
fortunes of Iraqis willing to invest domestically to foreign competition. This also has implications for 
privatization.  Keeping  it  closed  from  foreign  capital  may  give  ‘illegitimately’  rich  opportunity  to 
acquire  state  assets.  Affording  protection  to  privatized  firms  in  the  form  of  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers will only strengthen groups having a vested interest in blocking further liberalization and 
opening new areas for rents. Hence, free foreign trade regime and open investment regime are the 
key to establishing competitive markets in Iraq and preempting the emergence of powerful interest 
groups blocking liberal reforms. 
2. Arguments for Protection 
Arguments against free trade regime are threefold: First, trade should be taxed in order to 
generate revenue to the government. Indeed, historically taxes on trade were the main source of 
government  revenue  and  in  many  least  developed  countries  continue  to  account  for  their 
significant  share.  Countries  with  duty-free  regimes  (Estonia,  Hong-Kong,  Singapore)  have  well 
developed tax administrations. Hence as long as there are no other easily taxable sources, border 
charges  make  sense  but  only  insofar  as  they  are  uniformly  applied.  Otherwise  the  authorities 
infringe  upon  the  private  sector  in  determining  what  to  produce  and  consume  and,  ultimately, 
where resources are to be allocated. 
Second, net exporters of natural resources (usually oil) may seek to impose tariffs to limit the 
appreciation of their domestic currencies triggered by trade surpluses. The purpose is to avoid 
‘Dutch disease’ with its negative impact on non-industrial sector. Considering huge reconstruction 
needs estimated at almost US$ 60 billion over 2004-0716 and Iraqi huge external debt of between 
US$ 120 and 200 billion, Iraq is rather an unlikely candidate to become another victim of the Dutch 
disease. To the contrary, exchange rate should provide an extra protection to domestic producers. 
Third, it is argued that in the absence of protection there would be no industrialization and the 
agricultural sector would be devastated by subsidized exports from highly developed countries. As 
                                                  
16 The World Bank estimates overall stock reconstruction needs in 14 priority sectors to be in the order of US$36 
billion. The CPA’s estimate for sectors not covered by the World Bank/UN assessment, including security and oil, is US$ 
20 billion.   
                Studies & Analyses  No. 259 - Economic Regime for Iraq: The Foreign Trade Perspective 
16 
for industrial protectionism, poverty or unemployment considerations, rather than infant industry 
argument,  tend  to  form  its  cornerstone  under  circumstances  peculiar  to  the  Iraqi  economy. 
Liberalization would then lead to the persistence of high levels of unemployment due to the inability 
of the Iraqi industrial sector to withstand competitive pressure from imports. As Fadhil Mahdi from 
the UNDP stated: “Iraq’s technological prowess in the civilian sector is worse than Russia’s in the 
90’s. Opening up to competition at a mere 5 percent tariff will most probably ruin many producers 
and exacerbate unemployment.”17 
The stakes are high, as the state sector has been an important employer in Iraq. Since many 
assets were looted, most state-owned enterprises do not produce anything at the moment and 
most employees get paychecks from CPA. It is rather doubtful that a tariff of 15 or 20 percent 
would save these enterprises from bankruptcy. 
However, the question germane in this context is whether trade policy is the most efficient 
instrument to address the unemployment issue. The answer is emphatically negative. If something 
has  to  be  done,  explicit  subsidies  are  better  than  tariffs  for  that  purpose.  Consider  the 
consequences of using tariffs to protect selected industrial sectors. What level of tariff rates would 
assure their re-birth and survival? One suspects that they would have to be set at a very high level, 
simply because historically Iraqi SOEs were not exposed to international competition and their 
assets had been largely destroyed. Like SOEs in centrally planned economies, political rather than 
economic considerations were behind their emergence. The industrial structure erected in Iraq 
under  state-run  import-substituting  strategy  reflects  neither  Iraq’s  endowment  in  factors  of 
production  or,  consequently,  its  comparative  advantage.  Even  without  surveys  taking  stock  of 
assets  and  liabilities  of  SOEs,  one  may  reach  the  conclusion  that  three  decades  of  economic 
negligence, war economy, sanctions and, more recently, looting has resulted in the total absence 
of value added that could be generated by SOEs at international prices. 
Data on Iraqi exports seem to corroborate this observation, albeit we do not have information 
on the ownership structure of firms involved in export activities. The value of manufactured exports 
(Standard International Trade Classification 5 through 8 excluding 68) fell from US$ 267 million in 
1989 to the annual average of US$ 22 million over 1997-2001. With the average sales of US$ 9.5 
million, the electrical equipment sector (SITC. 77) was the largest exporter in this period. Exports of 
other  two-digit  SITC  manufacturing  sectors  were  miniscule  with  the  second  largest  exporter  – 
telecommunication equipment – reaching US$ 2.3 million on average over 1997-2001 (derived 
from mirror statistics in COMTRADE database).  
But the averages do not tell the full story. Between 1997 and 2000 the value of manufacture 
exports fell precipitously from US$ 33 million to US$ 12 million. There were only seven two-digit 
SITC manufacturing sectors in 2001 with values of exports exceeding US$ 1 million. These sectors 
included  telecommunications  equipment  (US$  2.5  million),  metalworking  machinery  (US$  1.9 
million), metal manufactures (US$ 1.9 million), perfumes (US$ 1.8 million), industrial equipment 
                                                  
17 As quoted in Madrick (2003).  
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(US$ 1.7 million), electrical equipment (US$ 1.5 million down from US$ 28 million in 1997), and 
photographic  equipment  and  clocks  (US$  1.2  million).  The  values  of  exports  of  four  sectors 
contracted rather dramatically in 2001 as compared with 1999 – electrical equipment down 75 
percent, photographic equipment and clocks down 44 percent, metalworking machinery down 43 
percent and telecom equipment down 34 percent from their respective levels in 1999. 
It is unclear whether the contraction in exports also indicates a similar collapse in domestic 
manufacturing capacities. Export performance may not offer many clues, as it had been volatile 
and driven by the sales of electrical equipment. The share of electrical equipment in manufactured 
exports had been on the decline since 1997, when it reached 85 percent with the value of exports 
of US$ 28 million. Subsequently its share fell to 43 percent (US$ 9 million) in 1998, 27 percent 
(US$ 6 million) in 1999, 15 percent (US4 2 million) in 2000, and 9 percent (US$ 2 million) in 2001. 
Simultaneously, exports of other manufacturing sectors increased between 1997 and 1999 more 
than threefold from US$ 5 million to US$ 17 million, fell in 2000 to US$ 11 million and increased to 
US$ 16 million in 2001. For a firm this might have been an impressive sales performance. But for 
an economy with the GDP around US$ 27 billion and a past record of exports at almost US$ 300 
million it is an indication of enormous de-industrialization that had taken place in the 1990-2001 
period. 
Manufacturing sector, which even before the 1991 Gulf War was not integrated into global 
manufacturing, has remained decoupled from international markets. There has been little two-way 
trade in the same manufacturing sectors, as shown by the values of the well-known Grubel-Lloyd 
index.18 These were in single-digit ranges and fell from 5.6 percent in 1998 to 3.5 percent in 1999, 
1.4 percent in 2000, and 1.1 percent in 2001. For comparative purposes, consider that the value of 
this index for low middle-income economies hovers at around 30-50 percent. 
Hence,  assuring  the  survival  of  SOEs,  or  for  that  matter  of  whatever  has  been  left  of 
manufacturing would probably require affording very high levels of protection to selective sectors of 
the economy. The resulting ‘cascade-type’ tariff structure would negatively impact Iraq’s economic 
performance through higher domestic prices, erosion of competitiveness of non-protected firms 
and distortions in the choice of future activities. Tariffs are the implicit tax with efficiency (resource 
cost) and equity (income redistribution) implications. High tariffs on products of SOEs would lead to 
higher domestic prices. Glancing at a list of SOEs, these would include higher prices for cement, 
cotton, fertilizers, iron and steel, petrochemicals, paper, etc.  Many of these products are used as 
inputs  in  other  sectors.  This  would  contribute  to  higher  prices  in  other  sectors.  If  these  were 
significantly  above  world  prices,  they  would  be  unable  to  withstand  international  competition. 
Capital would then move from ‘genuinely’ competitive sectors to ‘artificially’ competitive sectors 
further exacerbating welfare loss.  
                                                  
18   The GL index of intra-industry trade between two partners is usually expressed as: GL = 1 - ∑[ Xi - Mi / ∑ (Xi + 
Mi)], where X and M are exports of a country and imports by a partner correspondingly of product i. The index suffers 
from two problems: aggregation and aggregate trade imbalances.   
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Since the uniform tariff schedule minimizes distortions in production and distribution, would a 
uniform tariff rate provide a stimulus to the development of domestic industrial production? For the 
reasons  discussed  above,  it  would  have  to  be  set  at  a  relatively  high  level.  Neutrality 
notwithstanding this would lead to a strong anti-foreign trade bias with huge impact on domestic 
prices. 
What  about  extending  protectionist  umbrella  only  to  agriculture?  Around  one-third  of  Iraqi 
population live in rural area and this sector enjoys high level of protection in most developed and 
developing countries including Middle East. Iraq has always been a net importer of agricultural 
products.  As  can  be  seen  from  data  tabulated  in  Table  3,  exports  of  foods  accounted for  3-4 
percent of agricultural imports in 1989-90 and 1999-2001 and those of agricultural materials for 16 
and  20  percent  respectively.  In  2001  not  a  single  two-digit  SITC  agricultural  sector  generated 
exports exceeding imports. 
Table 3: Trade in agricultural products and exports as percent of imports in 1989-90 and 1999-2001 
(in million of US dollars and percent) 
Trade Balance (in million of US 
dollars) 
Export as percent of imports  SITC. Rev. 2 
1989-90  1999-01  1989-90  1999-01 
All food products (0+1+22+4)  -1,476  -579.0  3.4  3.7 
Agricultural materials (2-22-27-28)  -139  -7.3  15.6  19.9 
Textile fibers (26)  -53  0.5  12.9  159.9 
All goods (0 to 9)  4,814  10,706  171  520 
Source: Derived from data in UN COMTRADE database as reported by Iraqi trading partners. 
Furthermore, agricultural exports, which virtually disappeared by 1993, recovered somewhat 
over 1998-2001, although they were still in value terms at only 45 percent of their 1989 level. 
Exports of food products registered much stronger recovery than agricultural materials. The latter 
stood at 4 percent of their exports in 1989 (Figure 2). Since imports of agricultural materials have 
also significantly declined, this may indicate the increase in production for domestic use. 
The protection of this sector is usually justified in terms of national security, social stability, and 
subsidized exports from highly developed countries. But none of these seems to withstand scrutiny 
when cast against Iraq’s circumstances. Agricultural self-sufficiency is not a feasible option, and 
market-driven profile of agricultural output, given Iraq’s climate, soil and endowment in water, is 
probably significantly different than subsidized export baskets from countries located in temperate 
climate and abundant in water. Furthermore, a special argument for protection of the agricultural 
sector does not seem to apply to a sector devastated by underinvestment and misallocation of 
resources  further  exacerbated  by  subsidies  (especially  of  water).19  It  seems  that  it  would  only 
delay the transition to a market-based agricultural system. 
                                                  
19  Since  imports  are  now  not  subject  to  duties  or  any  other  administrative  restrictions,  the  usual  argument  for 
gradualism in removal protection to calibrate to cropping patterns does not apply.  
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3. Political Economy and ‘External’ Arguments for Free Trade 
By almost any mainstream economist’s standards, free trade extended not only to goods but 
also to services is the best trade policy. Fully liberalized transportation and telecommunication, in 
particular, followed by financial services assure competition and remove important barriers to trade 
faced by many developing countries. The theoretical argument, even accounting for strategic trade 
theory, in favor of free trade is overwhelming.  
On purely economic grounds, this is the best solution in particular for an oil-rich economy with 
devastated  industrial  structure  for  at  least  two  reasons.  First,  only  competition  from  imports 
combined with a friendly business/investment climate can produce industrial restructuring in line 
with Iraq’s endowment in factor of production and comparative advantage. 
Second, low foreign trade related transaction cost keeps the prices of tradables low. Since 
most basic food staples are imported, border and non-border charges would raise prices of these 
products. This implicit tax would have particularly negative impact on the urban poor. 
Leaving aside standard arguments, there are also other political economy aspects related to 
the existing free trade agreements and issues of governance favoring the adoption of a free trade 
regime. Free trade regime is not only about tariffs on trade in goods. In order to tap its full benefits, 
non-tariff measures should be kept to the minimum and services should be open to competition. 
These are briefly discussed in turn below.  
Bilateral regional liberalization  
Since Iraq has already been involved in bilateral regional liberalization, some portion of its 
imports  will  enter  its  markets  free  of  duties  provided  that  the  new  government  honors  these 
agreements. According to the Ministry of Trade, the government has signed free trade agreements 
(FTA) with 11 Arab countries. Most of these agreements were signed in 2001-02 as part of Iraq’s 
concerted effort to skirt the UN international trade embargo. The Internet search has identified ten 
countries (Table 4).20 
                                                  
20 Oman may be one that had signed FTA with Iraq but no agency or press information was found to confirm it.  
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Table 4: FTA Partners, date of agreement and significance in Iraq’s trade 
   Free Trade Agreements 
Iraqi imports. Average 
2001-2002 (in US$ million) 
Share in total imports 
average 2001-2002 
Algeria  Jun-01  50.4  1.0% 
Bahrain  Jan-02  0.1  0.0% 
Egypt  Jun-01  92.1  1.9% 
Jordan  Jul-02  543.0  11.0% 
Libya  Jun-01  0.0  0.0% 
Lebanon  Apr-02  29.1  0.6% 
Qatar  November-02  0.1  0.0% 
Syria  January-01  0.0  0.0% 
Tunisia  February-01  81.2  1.6% 
Yemen, Republic of  2002  4.0  0.1% 
Subtotal    800  16.2% 
EU    1,696  34.3% 
US    39  0.8% 
Source: Information  on FTAs derived from original  official news and other internet sources and on Iraqi trade from 
partners’ foreign trade data as reported to the IMF Direction-of-Trade database. 
Ten identified Iraq’s FTA partners accounted for 16 percent of Iraq’s average imports in 2001-
02. This share may be significantly larger. As mentioned earlier Syria did not report trade with Iraq 
to the IMF DOT database, although there are indications that it traded with Iraq, and Egypt might 
have underreported it, as there seems to be discrepancy between IMF data and statements from 
Egyptian trade officials. Quotes from official data in both countries suggest that actual trade was 
significantly larger, although it remains unclear the extent to which it involved re-exports or other 
operations – as argued earlier – circumventing the UN trade sanction regime.  
Hence, while it is impossible to give even a rough estimate, it seems that the share of Arab 
FTA partners was probably twice as high as indicated in the IMF DOT database. This should not 
suggest, however, they will be able to maintain this share once trade with Iraq is conducted in 
accordance with market rules and its domestic markets are fully contestable. 
On the other hand, however, with the normalization of Iraqi external trade relations, the share 
of other partners, especially that of the European Union, United States and East Asia (in particular 
South Korea and Taiwan) is likely to significantly expand. Hence, unusually trade turnovers with 
some Middle East countries are unlikely to persist in the future. 
The  share  of  trade  exempt  from  tariffs  because  of  preferential  agreements  may  expand. 
Consider  that  Iraq  will  be  under  strong  pressure  to  observe  the  existing  FTAs  in  order  not  to 
antagonize  its  Arab  neighbors.  For  these  reasons,  the  new  government  may  not  only  want  to 
continue  the  Arab  path  of  regional  trade  liberalization  but  also  extend  the  existing  network  to 
members of Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), i.e., Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
and United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, these pressures for bilateral liberalization will not only  
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come from regional partners that remain now outside the Iraqi network but also from two major 
trading superpowers – the EU and U.S. Both of them have been actively pursuing the path of 
bilateral liberalization circumventing WTO multilateral negotiations.  
As for the global dimension, U.S. has declared the establishment of a free trade area with 
Middle Eastern countries as one of its political objectives. It launched an initiative to create an US-
Middle East Free Trade Area within a decade. To this end, several bilateral free trade negotiations 
either began (Bahrain) or are to begin in 2004 (Egypt) with some of them either already completed 
(Syria) or to be completed soon. Iraq would be a likely candidate to begin negotiations with the US 
for two reasons. First, all these future members of the US-Middle East FTA already have bilateral 
FTAs with Iraq. Second, the project would be incomplete without Iraq’s participation. Since Jordan, 
also a party to number of regional FTAs including Iraq, has a FTA with the US,  
The EU is following a slightly different track with the “Wider Europe – Neighborhood” initiative. 
It is negotiating FTA with the GCC while simultaneously it has been pushing under the Euro-Med 
cooperation framework for free trade area among EU associates – Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Iraq already has FTAs with all these countries except Morocco. It also borders Turkey, 
which enjoys EU accession status. Inclusion of Iraq into a free trade area with the EU cannot be 
dismissed. 
While it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty, the share of preferential partners 
in Iraq’s imports in the coming years, the historical data – with all due qualifications concerning 
their quality (see Section 3 above) – would suggest that around 75-95 percent of Iraqi imports may 
not be subject to MFN tariffs. Even assuming very likely asymmetries in respective schedules of 
tariff removal in a possible EU or US-Iraq free trade agreement, i.e., longer periods for Iraq, the 
share  of  duty  free  imports  encompassing  products  not  manufactured  in  Iraq  would  be  quite 
significant. Furthermore, consider that the US’ direct involvement in reconstruction will inevitably 
lead to much larger US exports than in the past. Assuming the increase in this share to its pre-Gulf 
War level of 12 percent, potential preferential imports would account for around two-thirds of the 
total Iraqi imports. Even without the EU-Iraq FTA, whatever the combined share of Arab and US 
imports into Iraq might be, it is rather unlikely than it would be lower than one-third of total imports.  
But in fact the actual share might be significantly higher, as the possibility of obtaining duty-
free access will undoubtedly provide incentive to cheat on certificates of origin. The strength of the 
incentive  will  depend  on  the  extent  of  reverse  discrimination,  i.e.,  magnitudes  of  preferential 
margins. For countries with weak administrative capacities, the scope of fraudulent certificates of 
origin  may  be  quite  substantive.21  This  takes  us  to  the  relationship  between  free  trade  and 
governance. 
                                                  
21  Examples abound. BMW automobiles entering Georgia as ‘Made in Russia,’ or a whole range of products that 
entered the Province of Kosovo as produced in Macedonia, although the latter had never produce them.  
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Governance and other issues  
The inevitable legacy of pre-war foreign trade regime is that Iraq will face serious weaknesses 
in governance specific to the conduct of international trade. Customs was widely viewed as being 
an oppressive and corrupt system. It appears, therefore, that both the human resources and the 
physical infrastructure in Customs are inadequate to facilitate trade. Furthermore, the difficulty in 
assuring  uniform  treatment  across  points-of-entry  into  Iraqi  customs  territory,  exacerbated  by 
differences between the Northern part and Central and Southern parts, will only increase with the 
growth in administrative complexity of a foreign trade regime.  
The  great  advantage  of  free  trade  regime  is  that  it  is  simple  and  almost  immune  to  mis-
management. It drastically reduces administrative burden on Customs Administration and other 
government  agencies.  By  the  same  token,  it  also  significantly  diminishes  the  potential  for 
corruption, as it removes, albeit not completely, ‘money’ from daily customs dealings with traders. 
In fact, several important administrative burdens disappear when a country adheres to a duty-
free regime. For starters, neither Customs nor traders have reasons to bargain over the ‘real’ value 
of a shipment. There is no need for administration in charge of solving possible disputes arising 
over valuation. The trader has no incentive to bribe a customs officer to lower the assessment. In 
addition, classification of imported products loses its significance, as duties do not depend on how 
customs classifies an item. (Misclassification of products is often used to extract payments from 
traders).  
Another complex and contentious issue that disappears with a duty-free regime relates to the 
determination of origins of imports. Customs still has to collect information but only for statistical 
purposes.  There  is  no  reason  to  discriminate  against  sources  of  imports,  as 
preferential/discriminatory treatment looses its relevance.  
The  raison  d’être  of  various  administrative  arrangements  designed  to  mitigate  anti-foreign 
trade bias inherent in foreign trade regimes discriminating against imports in favor of domestic 
products  and  services  disappears  as  well.  These  include  export  processing  and  other  special 
economic zones established to avoid cumbersome administrative formalities and customs, and 
various  schemes  of  tariff  rebates  (customs  drawbacks,  etc.)  granted  to  exporters.  They  are 
administratively  complicated  –  not  to  mention  that  they  are  usually  not  very  effective  in 
encouraging exports. Moreover, products form local firms located in special economic zones and 
enjoying access to duty free imports and often tax holidays very often find their ways into local 
markets creating unfair competition for other domestic firms and depriving the government of tax 
revenues.  
In short, duty-free trade regime applied to all imports creates relatively transparent and simple 
administrative environment devoid of a number of opportunities for corruption and rent seeking. 
This in turn substantially lowers the ‘hassle cost’ of conducting business operations in a country. 
In addition, there is a highly pragmatic reason not to have Customs involved in clearance, 
customs evaluation and collecting duties on shipments into Iraq. Its customs infrastructure is not  
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fully operational as yet. Iraq had inland customs clearance facilities that – except for the Northern 
region where they remain largely intact – were either destroyed or looted during the war (Kelly et 
al. 2003). 
Liberal conditions in access: other prerequisites  
Tariff rates, even if set at zero rates, may do little for a country to tap benefits offered by free 
trade as long as there other barriers to trade in place. While there is a whole array of non-tariff 
tools  used  by  governments  to  discriminate  against  foreign  suppliers,  five  policy-areas  deserve 
special attention – the right of establishment, anti-trust regulations, import licensing, cumbersome 
border  procedures,  technical  barriers  to  trade,  and  antidumping.  Among  ‘behind-the-border’ 
measures  backbone  services,  i.e.,  telecommunications,  transport,  financial,  distribution,  and 
business services are particularly important, as they are crucial to trade in goods and facilitate 
resource flows between countries. In a nutshell, they call for the establishment of pro-competition 
environment. 
Regulations concerning the right of establishment should assure that there is no discrimination 
against foreign firms seeking to establish a presence in the markets for goods and services. Both 
foreign firms and domestically owned firms should compete on the same footing, i.e., there should 
be no discrimination in their treatment in state policies. This requirement appears to have been 
already met. CPA Orders 39 and 40 (on foreign investment and banking, respectively) recognize 
the principle of national treatment and open all sectors except those dealing with natural resources. 
The land can be leased for up to 40 years. As for banking, Order 40 allows foreign banks to 
establish branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures with local banks with a barrier set at less than 
50  percent  of  ownership.  Both  these  measures  go  a  long  way  to  establishing  a  competition-
enhancing environment. 
As for technical barriers to trade, Iraqi national mandatory standards (excluding phyto-sanitary 
standards – see below) should be done away without review. For one, conformity assessment 
procedures are expensive and will significantly increase transaction costs of imports. Further, there 
is currently no capacity to conduct testing and issue certificates, which are necessary for voluntary 
or regulatory standards mandated by a government. 
This should not suggest that Iraq should not have a functioning system of technical standards. 
To  the  contrary,  it  will  be  needed  for  Iraqi  industrial  development,  simply  because  standards 
promote  economies  of  scale,  protect  public  health  or  the  environment,  facilitate  information 
exchange, comparison of products by consumers and market transactions through reduction of the 
costs of uncertainty.  
Yet,  Iraq  should  start  with  a  modern  market-based  system  driven  by  private  sector. 
Considering that this requires a functioning rule of law (liability laws, etc.), the process should not 
be rushed. It should avoid copying the practice of other countries in the Middle East of requiring 
that  relevant  testing  on  all  imports  be  done  at  their  national  laboratories.  Highly  developed  
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countries  have  simply  better  testing  centers  as  well  as  standards  adequately  protecting  public 
health  and  environment.  Last  but  not  least,  it  should  simply  adopt  standards  used  in  highly 
developed economies. This would allow exports to incur costs for national certification.22  
But  there  is  clearly  a  legitimate  issue  of  phyto-sanitary  standards  indispensable  to  protect 
public  health  and  the  environment.  Since  facilities  are  in  a  short  supply,  the  task  should  be 
simplified,  transparent  and  focused  on  a  selected  group  of  products  that  may  pose  significant 
public health risks. The balance should be struck between legitimate public health concerns and 
costs to traders. The list of agricultural products with highest potential to public health should be 
identified,  and  these  products  should  be  randomly  inspected  in  border  crossing  points.  As  for 
expired pharmaceuticals, the customs would check for that. 
The last potential non-tariff barrier relates to antidumping, which – with expansion of WTO 
disciplines to several non-tariff trade barriers – has become a favorite protectionist weapon used 
not only by developed but also increasingly by developing countries. One may expect that CPA will 
be pressurized to assist Ministry of Trade in developing an antidumping legislation designed to 
prevent imports at a price below the production cost.  
This course of action should be resisted for several reasons. International experience and a 
large body of economic literature show that antidumping actions rarely, if at all, address cases that 
present  real  threat  to  competition.  The  existence  of  an  antidumping  legislation  would  simply 
increase  the  leverage  of  protectionist  interests  over  the  government.  It  breeds  lobbying  and 
corruption, and, in consequence, diverts scarce entrepreneurial talent into the political process. It 
absorbs  scarce  administrative  and  professional  resources  to  activities  that  are  inherently  rent 
seeking. It creates temptation to resort to antidumping to cover whatever sort of import restrictions 
seems politically necessary. 
An  alternative  superior  to  anti-dumping  arrangements  is  the  competition  law  enforcement 
agency with a statutory mandate to determine the net cost, taking into account the interests of both 
users of imports and producers, to the economy of proposed trade suppressing measures. 
While this section focused exclusively on trade in goods, the issue of establishing a liberal 
regime for services is as, if not more, important. The international evidence suggests that low trade 
barriers in services create employment, reduce transaction costs and lower prices for both exports 
and imports. Firms are then more likely to penetrate foreign markets. While this calls for a more 
detailed analysis, opening of services to foreign competition along the lines covered by the WTO 
General Agreement on Services should be an integral part of a new trade regime for Iraq. The 
critical  sectors  are  transportation  and  telecommunication,  followed  by  financial  services.  These 
should be fully liberalized to assure competition and any notion of exclusivity for domestic carriers 
should be removed. 
                                                  
22 For the discussion of benefits of this approach, see World Bank (2003, p. 179).  
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Conclusion  
On top of purely economic considerations, there is a strong political economy argument in 
favor of a free trade regime, which takes into account unique circumstances of Iraq. It can be 
summarized as follows: The free trade regime will considerably reduce the administrative burden 
on  state  agencies  –  an  important  point  considering  Iraqi  weak  administrative  capacities.  It  will 
increase  transparency,  simplicity  and  thus  lower  the  potential  for  corruption.  Special  attention 
should be paid, however, to non-tariff barriers, as there will be pressure to introduce them in the 
absence of tariff protection. Last but not least, it will render irrelevant strive for tariff exemptions, 
free economic zones, export platforms, etc. 
The fact that only few countries have a free trade regime, although an increasing number – 
including Middle East North African countries – are pursuing it, both unilaterally and in the regional 
setting, is testimony to the strength of private interest groups – often, entrenched elites benefiting 
from the status quo. It says nothing about the wisdom of pursuing this policy. 
4. Stakeholder dilemma: can a free trade regime survive beyond CPA? 
Ownership of a reform is very important. Reforms imposed from outside usually fail, as their 
implementation  is  sabotaged.  While  these  observations  apply  to  a  number  of  areas  including 
privatization,  foreign  trade  institutions  and  policies  are  an  exception.  Had  it  not  been  for 
international pressures or economic crises, protectionism would prevail over liberalization in the 
conditions of market access. This stems from unique characteristics of the fact that foreign trade 
decisions  are  classic  collective  action  problems  with  a  huge  asymmetry  in  incentives  between 
beneficiaries and losers (Olson 1965).23 Gains from foreign trade liberalization spread across wide 
segments  of  society,  whereas  losses  affect  only  inefficient  producers  from  import-competing 
sectors. Since losses are concentrated and gains dispersed, the potential losers have a much 
stronger incentive to organize in order to block the measure. The WTO helps countries solve this 
problem. In its absence, either the country can count on enlightened domestic elite (e.g., Estonia), 
preferential agreement with a ‘natural trading partner’ (e.g., Central Europe thanks to European 
Association Agreements) or other external actor. 
CPA has clearly fulfilled this function. Both CPA Orders 12 and 38 establishing a liberal foreign 
trade regime, probably skirting objections of Iraq’s Governing Council, have been the only course 
to follow. Opening the process to negotiations with local interest groups in Ministry of Trade and 
local businesses would result in arrangements favoring protectionism.  
                                                  
23 Historically, there have been two generally acceptable explanations of foreign trade policy-making (Ray 1988). 
The  first—the  micro  view—suggests  that  foreign  trade  policy  mirror  the  interaction  between  preferences  of  interest 
groups and politicians. The second—the macro view—accords the state considerable autonomy. It stresses national 
objectives and international commitments as major determinants of international trade policies. The former derive from 
values shared by political elite: these may range from commitment to free trade, on the one hand, and providing a trade 
restriction safety net for weak industries, on the other hand. International commitments refer to obligations under regional 
or multilateral agreements together with mechanisms for adjudicating trade disputes  
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But there is no guarantee that the Iraqi free foreign trade regime existence will withstand the 
pressures to which future governments will be subjected, as no institutional framework for foreign 
trade policy has been established as yet. The problem is that CPA Orders have not established 
institutional  arrangements  that  would  lock-in  the  present  arrangements.  The  ultimate  test  of  a 
sound institutional design for foreign trade is the extent to which it insulates the decision making 
process against capture by narrow interest groups. The importance of a good institutional design 
for foreign trade lies in its long term impact on policy making; give a country “... the institutions to 
make sound policy and you affect it for a decade” (Winters 1995, p.1). In other words, a sound 
economic policy may quickly evaporate unless accompanied by the right institutions containing bad 
policies. This is the challenge that CPA faces before transferring powers to the Iraqi Governing 
Council. 
5. Concluding comments 
Iraq already has the best trade policy, although on a temporary basis and not extended to all 
imports and service sector facilitating trade (transportation, port management). This offers unique 
opportunity to put it on a permanent basis. The shock that usually accompanies shifting to a more 
open  trade  regime  has  already  occurred.  The  introduction  of  tariffs  would  produce  another 
unnecessary shock in an economy that has undergone a series of shocks over the past three 
decades.  
But avoiding another shock is not the most important argument in favor of free foreign trade 
regime for goods and services. The elimination of a free trade regime would be counterproductive 
on several counts. First, it would fall short of saving the state sector, as this would require erecting 
a very high barrier against foreign competition.  
Second, it would fall short of generating customs revenue, as imports exempted from duties 
either because of preferential agreements, fraudulent certificates or exemptions granted, would 
narrow trade tax base. 
Third,  the  introduction  of  tariffs  would  put  huge  administrative  burden  on  a  very  weak 
administration and would create opportunities for corruption. Given the administrative legacy of the 
Baath regime and limited high skilled human resources, this should be avoided. 
Fourth, the introduction of tariffs or any other surcharges requiring payments based on the 
value of a shipment requires the existence of warehouses and other facilities indispensable to 
carry  out  customs  clearance.  Availability  of  equipment  allowing  for  non-cash  transactions  also 
helps. Both appear not to be readily usable and available. 
Last but not least, the introduction of a tariff schedule would tie to some extent the hands of the 
future  Iraqi  government  in  terms  of  how  it  wants  to  design  its  tariff  schedule.  Consider  that 
introducing a free trade regime would likely encounter opposition from groups taking advantage of 
economic rents created by tariffs.  
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Yet, custom clearance and facility issues notwithstanding, an argument can be made in favor 
of a foreign trade regime as outlined in CPA Order 39 introducing a five percent flat reconstruction 
charge. Iraq faces huge reconstruction cost. Collecting taxes at the border is an attractive option in 
a country without a functioning tax administration. While still a second best option, the advantages 
of a ‘reconstruction surcharge’ trade regime are as follows: First, it assures the broadest possible 
trade tax base, as it will apply to all imports independently of their origin or use. The reconstruction 
surcharge as an emergency temporary measure falls under safeguard provisions of FTAs. Hence, 
there is no need to exempt imports from preferential partners. It also removes the administrative 
temptation  to  exempt  from  duties  some  imports  on  the  grounds  of  their  great  importance  to 
economic welfare of Iraq. 
Second, it defers the decision concerning free trade agreements signed in the past by Iraq and 
leaves the future shape of trade institutions and policies in hands of a future government of Iraq.  
Third, it not only defers the decision as to what to do with the legacy of FTAs but it also 
renders  certificate  of  origins  irrelevant  for  duty  collection.  Certificates  of  origin  are  then  only 
relevant for statistical purpose. They do not bear fiscal consequences for traders and thus remove 
opportunity for corrupt behavior. 
Fourth, it retains important advantages of duty free regime, i.e., that is neutrality, uniformity 
and  considerable  administrative  simplicity.  Although  it  erects  an  extra  administrative  burden  of 
customs  valuation,  it  eliminates  other  ‘perverse’  incentive  such  as  misclassification  of  customs 
items. Furthermore, since this is a temporary measure, bureaucratic temptation to establish free or 
special economic zones will be tamed. 
Last but not least, it increases the probability of survival of a free trade regime, although it does 
not  guarantee  it,  once  surcharge  is  removed.  With  the  rate  low  of  5  percent,  no  large  group 
benefiting from rents is likely to emerge and capture foreign trade policies.   
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